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Heidegger’s Unzuhandenheit as a Fourth Mode of Being
Zachary Dotray
I. Introduction
In his magnum opus Being and Time, Martin
Heidegger lays out two unique beings, or entities, and their
corresponding modalities of being. Heidegger begins with
two primary classes of entities: Dasein and ‘innerworldly
beings.’ Within Heidegger’s ontology, ‘innerworldly beings’
can be further parsed into two kinds of entities: substances
and equipment. Substances, or ‘things’, are based upon
traditional philosophy’s1 notion of substance ontology, in
which a thing objectively present has qualities that do not
depend upon its situation. Heidegger calls the mode of being
of these beings ‘objective presence,’ or present-at-hand
[Vorhandenheit]. The second being Heidegger formulates is
equipment [Zeug], which has the mode of being of
‘handiness,’ or readiness-to-hand [Zuhandenheit]. And
finally, the third being, Dasein, which (generally)
corresponds to human entities, has the mode of being of
existence. Heidegger holds that while the entities of the first
two types of being do not depend on Dasein, their mode of
being itself does. In other words, while the equipment itself
does not depend on Dasein, the readiness-to-hand, or the
mode of being of the equipment, does. It is important to note
that while the modalities present-at-hand and readiness-to1

Heidegger specifically cites Aristotle and Kant as individuals who
represent the paradigm for traditional philosophy. In Heidegger’s
opinion, the metaphysics exemplified by the school of traditional
philosophy relies, at the most basic level, upon a subject/object
distinction.
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hand are separate from one another, this is due to the
dependence of the modalities of being upon Dasein’s
existence within the world. They apply to the same class of
entities, namely ‘innerworldly beings,’ as these are
independent of Dasein. As such, there can arise cases in
which it is difficult to discern the modality of being
belonging to some ‘innerworldly beings,’ and this is
precisely what we will be exploring in this essay.
In exposing the phenomena of the worldliness of the
world, Heidegger focuses primarily on the being of
equipment as ready-to-hand. However, in §15 and 162,
Heidegger very briefly delves into what he calls a specific
kind of readiness-to-hand – that is, un-readiness-to-hand
[Unzuhandenheit]. In this paper, I hope to accomplish two
goals: first, to expel my own confusion as to the way of
being of un-readiness-to-hand by analyzing what I take to be
its structure; second, to put forth the suggestion that unreadiness-to-hand should be considered as a fourth mode of
being, although still a way of being of Zeug (equipment),
which, similar to the mode of being of a substance, is an
‘innerworldly being.’3
II. Zuhandenheit: Readiness-to-Hand
In setting the course for this paper, I believe it will
prove useful to first briefly analyze Heidegger’s structure of
readiness-to-hand, where upon we can build the way of
being of un-readiness-to-hand. As opposed to objective
presence, the being of readiness-to-hand is encountered in
2

Entitled, respectively, The Being of the Entities Encountered in the
Environment, and How the Worldly Character of the Environment
Announces itself in Entities Within-the-World.
3
I will call un-readiness-to-hand a ‘way’ of being, and reserve the term
‘mode’ for the other three, established being of beings.
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Dasein’s “everyday being-in-the-world, which we also call
our ‘dealings’ [Umgang] in the world with entities withinthe-world” (66/7).4 This everyday association in the world,
and Dasein’s dealings with equipment, cannot be
characterized by some sort of perceptual cognition of the
qualities of substances objectively present, but rather is “a
handling, using, and taking care of things” (68). This
association takes its most primordial form when Dasein
literally uses the equipment. Heidegger explicates two
essential, though certainly not independent, aspects of
equipment in the mode of being ‘ready-to-hand.’ First,
equipment have in their way of being an ‘in-order-to.’ For
example, a hammer has the ‘in-order-to’ of hammering.
Heidegger writes:
In dealings such as this, where something is
put to use, our concern subordinated itself to
the “in-order-to” which is constitutive for the
equipment we are employing at the time; the
less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and
the more we seize hold of it and use it, the
more primordial does our relationship to it
become, and the more unveiledly is it
encountered as that which it is – as
equipment. (69)
It is important to note the stress that Heidegger
places on the actual using of the hammer, which brings its
being to the most primordial and genuine ready-to-hand. In a
sense, as Heidegger writes, the hammer is restored to its true
ready-to-hand through its withdrawing as a hammer per se.
4

Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962. Print. (I will use
the German pagination of Being and Time for references.)
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In other words, when Dasein is absorbed in the world and
dealing non-cognitively with equipment, the hammer
withdraws, or becomes transparent as a ‘hammer,’ and
becomes a primordial equipment ‘in-order-to’ pound nails.5
The structure of this ‘in-order-to’ brings Heidegger
to the second essential aspect of the mode of being of
readiness-to-hand: belonging to the referential totality of
equipment.6 Put another way, the totality of all equipment
must be given in advance of any one particular thing, and all
equipment contains within its being a ‘to hand’ reference to
the totality of all other equipment. To keep with the example
of hammering, a ‘hammer’ as an equipment can only make
sense within the totality of equipment such as nails, wood,
frames, houses, and so on. Without such reference, a
hammer would simply be taken as some thing objectively
present – an object with qualities. For some ‘thing’ to be a
‘hammer,’ it must have ‘in-order-to(s)’ which reference the
whole of equipment.
Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an
equipment. To the being of any equipment
there always belongs a totality of equipment,

5

Heidegger writes: “The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at
all, nor is it itself the sort of things that circumspection takes proximally
as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally readyto-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in
order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our
everyday dealing proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the
contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work”
(69).
6
In order to understand this point, however, we must realize that
‘reference’ does not mean anything linguistic.
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in which it can be this equipment that it is. 7
(68)
These two aspects taken together – the primary ‘inorder-to’ of equipment and the belonging to a referential
totality – allows Heidegger to make a further claim
regarding Dasein’s role within the referential totality. The
referential whole of ‘in–order-to’ eventually finds its final
‘in-order-to’ within Dasein’s ‘for-the-sake-of-which,’ in
which Dasein takes a stand on its being. This final ‘for-thesake-of-which’ is the stage where no further involvement
exists within in the referents. In other words, while the
equipment of hammer has the primary ‘in-order-to’ of
pounding nails (which can be drawn out into further ‘inorder-to(s),’ such as building a wall and building a house),
this must eventually lead to the final referent for which
Dasein employs the ‘hammer’ as equipment, which is to say,
to take a stand on its being.8 For example, in the case of the
hammer, this may be to take some stand as ‘being a
carpenter’ or ‘being a shelterer.’ Now, it is important to note
that this is certainly not a conscious decision on the part of
Dasein – one does not employ equipment for the explicit
purpose of taking a reasoned stand on one’s being. Instead,
this stand comes inseparably alongside the use of equipment,

7

Again, Heidegger writes: “Equipment – in accordance with its
equipmentality – always is in terms of its belonging to other equipment”
(68).
8
Heidegger writes: “But the ‘for-the-sake-of’ always pertains to the
being of Dasein, for which, in its being, that very being is essentially an
issue. We have thus indicated the interconnection by which the structure
of an involvement leads to Dasein’s very being as the sole authentic ‘forthe-sake-of-which’” (84).
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as it is only through this use
that Dasein comes to
understand its being.
In sum, we can say that equipment must have more
that an ‘in-order-to;’ to be what they ‘are’ they must also
have a referential part in the whole of equipment. Equipment
is truly and most primordially equipment when it is being
used, and this is how Dasein relates in its being of existence
to equipment. At the most absorbed (and basic) level, when
Dasein is simply dealing with an equipment, it becomes less
and less noticeable, and functions as withdrawing. We may
say confidently, then, that ‘an equipment’ ceases to be what
it is when is becomes isolated and no longer has a reference
to, or is part of, the whole. And, as equipment can be said to
exist within the referential totality most primordially when it
is in use and withdrawing (that is, in the mode of being
ready-to-hand), we are left to ponder the being of equipment
when not in use and withdrawing. Therefore, we may ask the
question: what mode of being does a hammer have when it
is simply lying there and not withdrawing?
III. Encountering Unzuhandenheit
Heidegger begins his discussion of un-ready-to-hand
by articulating three instances in which Dasein meets the
beings of equipment as “unusable”: conspicuousness
[Auffälligkeit], obtrusiveness [Aufdringlichkeit], and
obstinacy [Aufsässigkeit]. At the point in which Heidegger
addresses the way of being of un-readiness-to-hand, which
he believes to be a deficient mode of readiness-to-hand, he
seems to imply that all ways of encountering equipment as
un-ready-to-hand must involve some sort of “breakdown.”
However, much later in Division II of Being and Time, when
discussing the temporality of circumspection, Heidegger
states that there are ways of encountering equipment as unready-to-hand which do not involve a breakdown. I will
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begin by addressing the cases in which a breakdown is
involved, where upon we can build the cases in which a
breakdown is not required.
Heidegger holds that it is when Dasein comes across
equipment in the way of being un-ready-to-hand that the
referential whole of the ‘in-order-to(s)’ is revealed. In other
words, within Dasein’s non-cognitive dealings in the world,
the equipmental whole exists and is understood, but not
made intelligible. On the other hand, when this dealing in
the world is interrupted, Dasein is made to realize the
necessary determination that the whole has upon the
particular equipment. For example, it is only when the
hammer ‘breaks’ that Dasein realizes that there exists an
explicit equipment used for pounding nails. Until the
breakdown, the hammer, as equipment withdrawing, is
simply given as a general equipment ‘in-order-to’ pound
nails. I believe we can make sense of this with the semantic
difference of Dasein’s viewing the ‘hammer’ as a ‘nailpounder,’ when circumspectively dealing within the world,
as opposed to an explicit ‘hammer-tool for pounding nails’
after the interruption, when the equipment is given in the
mode of un-ready-to-hand. In Dasein’s encountering the unready-to-hand, Heidegger holds that Dasein is met with an
equipmental entity that has neither the mode of being of
readiness-to-hand, nor pure presence-at-hand, as a substance
would. Instead, he holds that Dasein encounters presence-athand alongside readiness-to-hand. He writes:
Un-readiness-to-hand…implies that what
cannot be used just lies there; it shows itself as
an equipmental Thing which looks so and so,
and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking
that way, has constantly been present-at-hand
too. Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in
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such equipment, but only to withdraw to the
readiness-to-hand of something with which one
concerns oneself…This presence-at-hand of
something that cannot be used is still not
devoid of all readiness-to-hand whatsoever;
equipment which is present-at-hand in this way
is still not just a Thing which occurs
somewhere. (73)
Throughout these sections in which Heidegger
discusses the relationship between readiness-to-hand and
presence-at-hand, I take him to be positing a bivalent
relationship. First, to some degree we can see that the being
of present-at-hand underlies the ready-to-hand. This
relationship seemingly has the quality of some form of
‘weak causality.’ In other words, if the present-at-hand, or
the substance with certain de-situated qualities did not exist,
neither would the ready-to-hand equipment. This
relationship comes to the fore as Heidegger discusses the
necessary ‘suitability’ of equipment. Not all substances can
be hammers, only those with the substantial qualities of
medium-length, a hard head, and so on. In another way,
however, we must view the relationship between the readyto-hand and the present-at-hand as one in which the readyto-hand must underlie the present-at-hand. This relationship
seemingly holds the quality of intelligibility. This must be
the case, as no sort of substantial qualities can make a
‘hammer-Thing’ a ‘hammer.’ In other words, no matter how
suitable some set of qualities given to a substance are for the
making of a hammer, a ‘hammer’ is only one insofar as it
exists within the referential totality. As such, the present-athand being of substance, such as a hammer, is only
intelligible through Dasein’s dealing with hammers qua
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equipment. Therefore, we may conclude that the modes of
being of present-at-hand and ready-to-hand mutually found
each other.
The first, and seemingly most obscene way in which
un-readiness-to-hand is encountered is through
obtrusiveness. In this “breakdown,” Dasein finds itself
within a situation where the necessary equipment cannot be
found, or is not ‘to hand’ [zur Hand] (73). This occurs when,
for example, set to the task of pounding nails, Dasein cannot
find a hammer. This causes all ready-to-hand objects within
the work-world that are given to become present-at-hand, as
Dasein cannot deal with anything until a hammer is also
given. In my opinion, this case of encounter appears the
most forceful, as everything appears present-at-hand with
Dasein standing helplessly before the work-world. This
encounter is obviously a form of a “breakdown” in which
‘innerworldly beings’ become present-at-hand, for
seemingly nothing further can be done without the hammer
being available.
The second form of encounter comes in the instance
of a more temporary “breakdown,” obstinacy, where an
entity as un-ready-to-hand “‘stands in the way’ of our
concern” (73). This encounter may come in the form of a
hammer’s head falling off. This form of un-ready-to-hand
reintroduces a mode of ready-to-hand, as Dasein is set to
task in repairing the particular equipment in-order-to resume
other dealings. These two modes of un-ready-to-hand have a
unique way of being present-at-hand alongside the ready-tohand, as both involve equipment de-situated. In other words,
the qualities of ‘missing’ or ‘broken’ exist across a range of
situations, and without particular reliance upon a context. A
‘broken’ hammer has the objective presence of ‘brokenness,’ such that although the ‘hammer’ still exists within the
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equipmental totality, it is also present-at-hand with certain
qualities. These “breakdown” encounters with the un-readyto-hand, in my opinion, follow Heidegger’s outline for the
introduction of worldliness through the un-ready-to-hand.
This ‘worldiness’ appears as the totality of equipment
encountered, and is therefore given explicitly when this
totality shows itself through un-ready-to-hand equipment
lending reference to the whole. I want to argue, however,
that the encounter with the un-ready-to-hand yet to be
discussed – conspicuousness – lends itself to a reading that
shows the necessity of considering the un-ready-to-hand as a
fourth mode of being.
According to Heidegger, conspicuousness can be
encountered in numerous ways. In §16, Heidegger primarily
focuses on the malfunction of equipment, which, for
example, may concern a hammer being ‘too heavy.’ Much
later in Being and Time, he states that it may also involve
something as innocent as “inspecting.” He writes,
concerning Dasein’s switch from “practical” circumspection
(ready-to-hand dealing) to “theoretical” investigation, which
involves the tying of the ready-to-hand to the un-ready-tohand by conspicuousness:
The tarrying which is discontinued when one
manipulates, can take on the character of a
more precise kind of circumspection, such as
‘inspecting’, checking up on what has been
attained, or looking over the ‘operations’
which are now ‘at a standstill’. Holding back
from use of equipment is so far from sheer
‘theory’ that the kind of circumspection with
tarries and ‘considers’, remains wholly in the
grip of the ready-to-hand equipment with
which one is concerned. (358)
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This precise ‘inspecting,’ yet remaining stuck in the
tools, is encountering the un-ready-to-hand. Heidegger
places this encounter along the path of moving from pure
practical dealing to theoretical investigation. In this, we may
understand the difference between de-situated and deworlded. As Dasein encounters equipment as ready-to-hand,
it does so in a completely situation-based context given
through the referential totality of equipment. As Dasein
begins to abstract, the mode of un-ready-to-hand is
encountered through ‘inspection,’ and in this mode,
equipment is seen as de-situated, which seems to mean
having ‘properties,’ though ‘properties’ dependent upon
context. Therefore, in a sense, the equipment is still quite
‘situated,’ though, as it is not primordially being ready-tohand, it has been taken out of its primary situation of
withdrawing. Finally, once Dasein is operating on the level
of ‘theorizing,’ it begins to deal with innerworldly beings
that are completely free of any referent within the
equipmental whole. 9
I take it, based on the quote given above, as well as
Heidegger’s discussion of breakdown within the encounter
of un-ready-to-hand, that there are two major ways in which
equipment can become conspicuous. The first, which
Heidegger primarily discusses, involves some sort of
9

I take an example of this to be the different ways of regarding speed: in
ready-to-hand dealing, equipment is moving relative to other equipment,
as some particular equipment moves at the speed it would take to do
some job. (A jackhammer moves with the necessary speed in-order-to
break concrete.) Once de-situated, particular equipment has the property
of moving fast. This fastness must still be relative to something, for
example, ‘too fast’ for me to operate it, but it is seen apart from its inorder-to. Finally, when a ‘theoretical’ investigation is taking place,
equipment moves at a certain velocity – without reference to any other
equipment.
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“break,” where a hammer is “too heavy” to do some job, and
therefore work, or absorbed dealing, must stop. However,
this is not necessarily the case. There is another way in
which the hammer is recognized as having properties
relevant for hammering, for example, heavy, but where
Dasein is not intending the hammer for use at this moment,
and is instead ‘inspecting’. The un-ready-to-hand thus
encountered through ‘inspection,’ unlike ready-to-hand,
does not operate in the mode of Dasein’s dealing with
equipment withdrawing. Yet, it is also unlike things
objectively present, as Dasein still remains within tools
when inspecting them. In other words, when Dasein realizes,
for example, that the hammer is “heavy,” this heavy-ness
cannot be taken as a quality for objective presence, for it is
“heavy” for me, in this situation, relative to this other
hammer, and so on. The hammer, although “heavy,” still
remains within the referential totality of equipment, and has
not been de-worlded as objective presence must be. And yet,
as the hammer is simply lying there, and is not withdrawing,
it also is not being as genuine, primordial ready-to-hand.
Instead, as an “equipment,” it is both somewhat being readyto-hand, and somewhat displaying its objective presence
(74). It has the unique way of a being of un-ready-to-hand,
or maybe more appropriately, what one could call potential
ready-to-hand. It is recognized as a hammer, with some
property relevant for hammering, and therefore relative to
other equipment in the referential totality, yet has not broken
down to expose this referential totality, and further has not
been ‘theoretically’ investigated to the point of becoming
de-worlded.
I argue that Heidegger makes a mistake in classifying
this way of being as a deficient mode of being, subsuming it
under ready-to-hand. As the hammer is lying there, although
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it certainly has an ‘in-order-to’ in terms of the referential
whole, it does not have the explicit ‘in-order-to’ of a
transparent, withdrawing, equipment. I may, in fact, observe
it there, though not as an objective presence, but as an un-,
or maybe more appropriately, non-ready-to-hand.
IV. The Being of Unzuhandenheit
As Heidegger often recognizes and notes, when
participating in the study of fundamental ontology, we must
look to the phenomena first. So, we must ask ourselves,
what is the phenomenon of the hammer, recognized as a
hammer, lying there? Modes of being, as that on the basis of
which [woraufhin] entities are intelligible, must be that
which in the background is already present, prephenomenologically, in order that we understand the entities
of this non-equipment. In other words, analogous to the
requirement of the mode of being of ready-to-hand being
already understood before Dasein can understand a
‘hammer,’ so must the non-ready-to-hand be prephenomenologically grasped before one can know a
particular equipment in such a mode. I contend that when we
understand a being as lying there, inappropriate, though fully
functional, for a situation, we understand it in terms of both
the referential totality, and its non-serviceability. For something to be equipment qua equipment, Heidegger writes, we
must understand this “‘serviceability-for’…[which] is an
ontological, categorical determination” (78). As such, the
hammer deemed “heavy” is understood as a potentially
ready-to-hand equipment. Yet, as it has been deemed by
Dasein not applicable for explicit use, and is instead simply
being ‘inspected’ relative to other equipment, it is
understood in its non-usefulness. By non-useful, and nonserviceable, I mean neither useful or serviceable, nor not-

218

useful or not-serviceable. Instead, I use the prefix non- to
connote a recognized irrelevance to current use-value
outside of ‘inspection’ itself. To put it differently, when I
understand the being of a hammer lying there, yet have no
reason to use it, I understand it both in regards to the
referential totality of equipment, and its potential ready-tohand. As I also understand it as not withdrawing or
transparent, I understand its being as un-ready-to-hand
equipment. And, based on this phenomenon, I argue that
through the encounter with an object in its place within the
referential whole, yet also in its situational non-usefulness, I
understand it in its genuine, everyday being. Thus, we must
view this un-ready-to-hand not as a subcategory of ready-tohand, but as a fourth mode of being, where equipment may
have either the being of ready-to-hand or of un-ready-tohand.

